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ABSTRACT
The Space Transportation System is now 
operational and a new evolution of space 
activities is emerging. Space is an 
international frontier and will be pursued 
by many nations, individually and 
collectively. Commercial exploitation of 
space systems is increasing with 
international breadth.
Launch services, formerly a government 
provided function, also are encountering an 
evolution. International competition is 
keen and plans proliferate for private 
industry involvement in this vital element 
of the space flight scenario.
The United States has made good its 
commitment to develop and bring into 
operational status a STS to meet its own 
need as well as to provide launch services 
to industry and other nations. lv!
The STS has tremendous growth potential 
utilizing existing flight elements, 
production capacity, logistics systems and 
launch/flight operations facilities. This 
paper describes the growth potential, 
develops a rationale for a Shuttle Derived 
Cargo Vehicle and illustrates its role as 
well as the economic implications of its 
addition to the STS inventory of launch 
systems.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is entering a new era in 
launch vehicles with the very successful 
completion of the design, development, test 
and evaluation (DDT&E) phase of the Space 
Transportation System. It can be readily 
projected, based on the history of launch 
vehicles, that the shuttle configuration 
will evolve over time, that its basic
concepts will find operational use for 
several decades and that a number of factors 
will interact to produce specific 
derivatives of the original configuration.
The evolution of space launch vehicles in 
the past has been motivated by increasing 
payload weights, volumes, and economics. 
This is reflected by Figure 1 in which 
specific launch cost trends, developed by 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) for an ESA 
study, are shown. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the same 
motivations will govern the development of 
launch vehicles in the Space Transportation 
System (STS) era. For example, there is an 
increasing recognition that later in this 
decade, additional investments will be 
required to support the growth in volume and 
weight of payloads to geosynchronous earth 
orbit (GEO). To satisfy these future 
requirements, the U.S. space launch program 
must remain economically attractive 'to be 
able to continue to support the growing U.S. 
commercial and international market.
The four reusable Space Transportation 
System (STS) Orbiter vehicles now planned 
were originally expected to be able to place 
DOD and NASA payloads into low earth orbit 
and have sufficient operational capability 
to launch other domestic, foreign and 
international payloads.
However, current forecast of requirements 
and capability indicate that even the total 
capability of a five orbiter STS program, 
the ESA Ariane, and the continuation of some 
of the current U.S. expendable launch 
vehicle fleet will be marginal in meeting 
the requirements in the late 1980 f s and the 
Free World's total launch capability will be 
inadequate to meet the demand of the 90 *s 
and beyond.
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Accordingly, it is imperative that the 
possibilities for the evolution of the U.S. 
space launch, capabilities in the STS era be 
reviewed from the standpoint of maintaining 
economica1 space opera tions •
LAUNCH DEMMID .PROJECTIONS.
The 'NASA uses a space transportation Traffic 
Model* formerly Mission 'Model, as support 
for planning and budgetary estimates which 
list the launch site and the flight rate by 
user. Since the inception of the STS, the 
model has been changed periodically to 
reflect the NASA's understanding of the user 
community's needs and the availability of 
the STS to meet those needs.
This STS model is sometimes misinterpreted 
to say that it portrays users 1 
requirements. While it does incorporate the 
NASA's understanding of those requirements 
as they can be satisfied by the STS, it is 
not required to cover the full breadth ofthe 
users 1 needs - nor is that its purpose. The 
basic purpose is to assist the NASA 
budgeting/planning function for the STS.
Determination of the total requirements for 
space activity from the user's perspective 
remains a much more elusive task. In the 
near term, 3 to 5 years, existing launch 
vehicle manifests can be used to establish 
reasonably firm requirements. To this 
point , users have made sufficient 
commitments to be included on the schedule. 
Beyond 5 years, these requirements are 
usually not well enough defined to be 
discussed outside of the particular user's
••organization.
For the purposes of this assessment, user
requirements were developed primarily from 
NASA and AIAA projections (References 1 and 
2)- A .summary of the projections are shown
In Figure 2. Two user requirements models 
are shown - low and high - to bound the
...anticipated demand.
Basically, the low model supports limited 
new NASA space program starts, assuming 
funding constraints. The commercial portion
of low model Is dominated by the AIAA
--projection of a continued 19% annual growth 
In communications on orbit capability — 
possibly a very conservative estimate. The 
high model considers a more favorable 
economic climate for and other civil
international science
, Including support of a manned
station. In the commercial
environment, the high model projects a 20%
growth, starting in 1990, including
orbit materials processing and manufacturing*
LAUNCH VEHICLE AVAILABILITY
The Western World's space launch capability 
currently consists of the STS, Titan, Delta, 
Atlas, Scout, ESA's Ariane, India's SLV-3, 
and Japan's N-l and N-2 launch vehicles. 
The Scout and Scout class vehicles are not 
considered in this assessment because of the 
relatively low performance capability in 
comparison to the others. Japan and India 
are each developing larger, Delta class 
launch vehicles which should be ready for 
service in the early 1990's.
The purpose of this assessment is to 
identify the availability of launch vehicles 
which could satisfy user's scheduled 
requirements through the year 2000.
STS Assessment
The NASA Space Transportation Operations 
Traffic Model, 1 March 1982, has two options 
through 1994: a "24" option and a "40" 
option. The 24 option builds through 1988 
to a maximum annual flight rate of 24 
flights per year with a fleet of 4 
orbiters. The 40 option builds through 1991 
to a maximum flight rate of 40 flights per 
year; however, this requires the funding of 
the fifth orbiter in FY 1983, which has not 
been approved to date. Both of these 
options are shown on Figure 2. It is 
evident that neither option can satisfy the 
user launch requirements with STS alone. 
Thus, one must consider additional 
expendable launch vehicles to accommodate 
the projected user demand.
ELV Status
Each ELV total launch rate availability, as 
shown in Figure 3, was determined using 
present production program plans, the 
overall historical launch records, and 
launch rates consistent with the existing 
launch pads.
To provide a common base for comparison, 
total launch rate for each ELV is plotted in 
Orbiter-equivalent terms. This equivalency 
was established by the AIAA (Reference 2). 
The resulting equivalent orbiter flights for 
each ELV are also shown in Figure 3.
Titan. The Titan is capable of a maximum 
of 4 launches per year per launch pad. 
There is one launch pad for the Titan IIIC 
(34D) at ETR and two launch pads at the 
Western Test Range (WTR) - one for Titan 
IIIB (34B) and one for Titan HID (34D). 
Thus, a buildup to 12 flights per year is 
possible. The current planning date of 
Titan termination is at the end of 1987. It
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should be acknowledged however, that 
commercial launchings of Titan are currently 
in progress.
Delta. The Delta is to be phased out early 
in the STS era, but may sustain new life due 
to STS launch rate uncertainties and the 
backed up launch demand for its services. A 
total of 12 flights per year is the maximum 
anticipated for the Delta, using two launch 
pads at ETR and one pad at WTR. Termination 
is planned for 1987.
At las/Centaur. Atlas/Centaur is currently 
scheduled to support Intelsat missions 
through 1985 with no further committed 
missions; however, FleetSatCom is a strong 
potential customer through 1987. A total of 
10 flights per year is achievable for the 
Atlas/Centaur out of two launch pads at 
ETR.
Ariane. The Ariane launch availability was 
determined by the advertised intentions of 
the launch agency, Arianespace. They are 
building to a 2 launch pad capability at 
Kourou by 1985. The Ariane 3 is scheduled 
to come on line in 1984, and the Ariane 4 in 
1986. The build up rate reflects this phase 
in, with a maximum of 12 launches per year 
being reached in 1988.
Japan and India. Both nations are working 
on a Delta-class capability, with an 
estimated availability early in the 1990*s. 
At this time, it appears that this 
capability will be used to satisfy 
indigenous needs. Figure 4 reflects a 1 
Orbiter equivalent (4 Deltas) flight rate 
through the 90's for these countries.
LAUNCH CAPABILITIES VS USER DEMAND
The maximum combined ELV and STS annual 
launch rate is shown in Figure 4. As 
indicated, the maximum launch rate is 50 
orbiter equivalent flights per year. 
However, the data displayed assumes the most 
optimistic forecast for the launch vehicles 
- 100% scheduling and availability. If in 
fact, the schedule for the ELVs and STS 
follows launch system historical trends, as 
well as aircraft fleet operational 
experience, and assuming the Arianne follows 
that pattern, an overall reduction in launch 
rates by about 25% are anticipated. 
Therefore, a more realistic picture is 
portrayed in Figure 5 which reflects launch 
vehicle availability under expected 
realistic conditions.
Under these conditions, even if all launch 
vehicles are maintained at these expected 
rates, user requirements will exceed the
launch vehicle availability by 1990 for the 
high model and by 1993 for the low model.
While maintaining the current U.S. ELV fleet 
to augment the STS appears to be a temporary 
solution, it is not a viable approach to 
meeting the user requirements in the 1990s. 
It is essential that an economical and 
responsive unmanned launch vehicle be 
developed to augment the STS. The most 
promising solution is a launch system based 
on existing STS elements, namely a Shuttle 
Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDCV).
SDCV CONFIGURATIONS
All SDCV configurations presented here share 
a common STS major element heritage: the 
external tank (ET), Space Shuttle main 
engines (SSMEs), solid rocket boosters 
(SRBs) and, to a major extent, orbiter 
avionics. Cost advantages accrue from 
shared STS/SDCV production, logistics and 
operations base and provide a near term 
heavy lift performance capability while 
avoiding major new DDT&E expenditures.
SDCV Side Mount Configuration
The SDCV Side Mount configuration, shown in 
Figure 6, retains the standard ET and 2 
SRBs. A cargo carrier,- consisting of a 
recoverable propulsion/avionics (P/A) module 
and an expendable payload (P/L) module, 
replaces the orbiter in the STS stack. The 
P/L module is capable of supporting payload 
up to 25 feet in diameter and 90 feet in 
length. The P/A module contains the main (3 
SSMEs) and secondary propulsion systems, 
avionics, electrical power, auxiliary power 
and thermal control systems. Reentry and 
recovery systems include the aeroshell 
structure, thermal protection system, 
parachutes, retrorockets, and landing gear. 
The SDCV Side Mount performance to a 
reference 28.5° 160 NM circular orbit is 
approximately 150,000 Ibs.
SDCV Inline I Configuration
The SDCV Inline I, shown in Figure 7, 
incorporates a shortened ET as the 
structural backbone. Two standard SRBs, a 
P/A module and a forward mounted payload 
shroud are all attached to the ET. The 
payload shroud can house a payload of up to 
25 feet in diameter and 75 feet in length. 
The P/A module is functionally identically 
to the SDCV Side Mount configuration 
discussed previously; however, only 2 SSMEs 
are employed. The Inline I performance to 
the referenced 28.5° 160 NM circular orbit 
is approximately 150,000 Ibs. A 3 SSME P/A 
module Inline I configuration would have a 
195,000 Ib. payload capability.
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SDCV_ In line: 11 Conf igura t ion
The SDCV Inline II is a growth version of 
the Inline I. The Inline II, shown in 
Figure 8, incorporates a stretched ET, 2 
standard SRBs and a total of 4 SSMEs housed 
in 2 P/A modules—identical to that of the 
Inline I. The payload shroud can house a 
payload of up to 33 feet in diameter and 100 
feet in length. The Inline II performance 
to the referenced 28.5° 160 NM circular 
orbit is about 240,000 Ibs. Growth potential 
exists for Inline II by using 3 SSMEs in 
each P/A module and would result in a 
payload capability of over 300,000 Ibs.
Performance Comparison
Figure 9 depicts the performance of the SDCV 
configurations up to equatorial 
geosyncuronous orbits. The performance 
characteristics assume a single stage 
expendable integral SDCV L02/LH2 upper 
stage properly sized to maximize the payload 
delivery capability. Performance 
characteristics of the STS and Saturn V are 
also shown for comparative assessment.
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
An analysis was performed to determine the 
life cycle cost (LCC) benefits of 
introducing SDCVs into the overall space 
transportation system to complement the 
orbiter fleet in satisfying the launch 
denand. Costs were estimated for all 
program phases 1—DDT&E, • production, and 
operations. Additional ' orbiters were 
assumed to be acquired in a time phased 
•saner to enable the "STS Only" to 
accommodate the user demand models and, in 
the case of the mixed STS/SDCV fleets, two 
additional orbiters were procurred to 
accommodate the user demand until the SDCVs 
became available in the early 1990s,
results of the analysis are shown in 
Figure 10 and graphically illustrates the 
si gnifieant savings potenti a11y avaliable 
through the incorporation of SDCVs to 
complement the STS.
Also, from the user point of view, the cost
per pound, or volume, of payload delivered
to orbit is substantially reduced as a 
result of the SDCV performance capability.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE
A representative SDCV hardware development
schedule was prepared to include the period 
of time from the authority to proceed (ATP) 
for a Phase C/D contract through 
.certifies £10,0 of initial operational
capability (IOC) of the overall SDCV 
program. This schedule, as shown in Figure 
11, includes a typical Phase A/B time span 
as a reference point of departure.
For present planning purposes, one flight 
demonstration is baselined prior to 
certification of IOC and it is anticipated 
that the first flight unit will undergo a 
flight readiness firing (FRF) analogous to 
that conducted for STS-1.
The schedule indicates that, in order to 
have SDCVs on-line by 1991, a Phase C/D 
hardware development program must be 
initiated in 1985.
PAYLOAD GROWTH PROJECTION
The SDCVs provide an additional benefit to 
the user community through its capability to 
accommodate payloads beyond that provided by 
the orbiter - both in volume and weight. 
NASA Space Systems Technology Model, 
Reference 3, contains NASA system and 
program requirements, technology trends, and 
forecasts for space technology. The model 
provides a base of information for guiding 
technology development for future systems 
and programs. A review of this model 
reveals numerous payload requirements which 
exceed the performance capability of the 
present STS as summarized in Table 1.
With respect to DOD, again many programs are 
projected which would benefit from SDCV 
enhanced launch capabilities. For example, 
consider the development plan for MILSTAR 
under the current ground rules (Reference 
4). The payload concept is currently 
constrained to the 5,000 Ib. geosyncronous 
performance of shuttle/IUS. The final 
operating configuration will weigh 
approximatly 10,000 Ibs. and will require 
two launches per satellite. Thus, a 
constellation of 12 satellites will require 
24 launches and cost approximately $2 
billion in launch costs, not including IUS 
costs.
With an SDCV only eight launches are 
required. The cost would be under $0.7 
billion, thereby, reducing the DOD budget 
for the MILSTAR program by over $1.3 
billion. This situation is representative 
of user cost considerations for GEO missions.
The Space Based Laser (SBL) program 
represents another good example. As 
indicated in References 5 and 6, the SBL 
requires diameters of 8 meters, or greater, 
depending on the power requirements and 
would weigh around 150-250K Ibs. A typical 
fleet size might consist of 18 spacecraft;
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thus, the STS launch requirements become 
excessive. Use of the SDCV with its greater 
weight and size capability would not only 
reduce the number of flights, but also the 
complexity of payload design.
OBSERVATIONS
To date the baseline STS program consists of 
a four orbiter fleet to provide launch 
services through the 1990s. Based on the 
projected user demand, the four orbiter 
fleet will only accommodate NASA and DOD 
requirements for the low model. Thus, the 
commercial market is largely left to be 
accommodated, to a major extent, by ELVs 
either government supported or funded by the 
private launch vehicle sector.
This is reflected by the increased interest 
within the private sector. For example, Dr. 
Klaus Heiss president of Space Tran, Inc. 
recently said "the lack of government 
funding for orbiter five should in no way 
prejudge the need for a commercial orbiter. 
Clearly, the country needs a fifth orbiter 
if the U.S. wants to capture its share of 
the commercial world space transportation 
market. It should not be left to foreign 
competition unchallenged." Foreign 
competitors now include Arianespace, and 
will include Japan, India, and Russia. 
Japan and India will have the potential for 
providing launch services to other 
countries. Russia has proposed to fly the 
Inmarsat maritime communications satellite 
for the European Space Agency (ESA) and is 
interested in establishing a marketing agent 
outside the Soviet Union.
The challenge to the foreign competition is 
surfacing through various private sector 
proposals to extend the useful lifetime of 
the present U.S. ELV fleet under private 
management - Transpace Carriers, Inc. for 
the Delta; General Dynamics Corporation and 
Space Services, Inc. for the Atlas Centaur; 
and Martin Marietta Corporation for the 
Titan. However, these programs will 
continue to use todays state of the art.
It is interesting to note that the ESA has 
approved funding for new space 
transportation systems 1 long term 
preparatory program which will study options 
beyond Arianne "in sufficient detail to lay 
down a long term policy and thus decide on 
new space transportation programs before the 
end of 1985." The priority of the European 
community is to maintain independent launch 
capability that meets foreseeable 
requirements of European and other users and 
is competative with existing or planned 
systems. Therefore, the U.S. must also 
continue to maintain its role as a leader in 
space through the study and development of 
launch systems using our present high
technology base incorporated within the 
present STS. This goal is best achieved by 
SDCVs.
Figure 12 illustrates two potential paths 
for the SDCV. Granted, if one considers the 
potentials beyond the mid 1990's other 
options are feasible such as a liquid rocket 
booster replacement for the SRB. However, 
it avoids the pivotal issue of a system to 
be operational in the early 1990*8 to meet 
the highly probably and very competitive 
market that will exist for space 
transportation.
The key issue that needs resolution in the 
immediate future is which course to follow; 
the SDCV Side Mount concept which would have 
minimum impact on the STS program, require 
the least investment and could be 
operational at the earliest date 
recognizing that it has limited growth 
potential - vs the SDCV Inline approach 
which could result in a family of SDCV's to 
accommodate forecasted market and provide 
the growth potential to cover major new 
needs that have as yet not surfaced. The 
Inline approach will have somewhat more of 
an impact on the STS system, facilities and 
operations, but at the same time will draw 
heavily on the technology, production, 
logistics and operations currently in place.
In summary, the SDCV compliments the STS, 
provides the U.S. the most attractive method 
to meet forecasted space transportation 
needs in the most economical way. It takes 
advantage of the STS investment and has* the 
potential of keeping the U.S. in the best 
competitive posture for the 1990 f s.
The SDCV is a low risk, low cost development 
and is economically attractive. The time to 
act is now if we are to retain the U.S. 
prominence in the 1990's.
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Figure 6. SDCV Side Mount Configuration
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Figure 7. SDCV Inline I Configuration
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Figure 8. SDCV Inline II Configuration
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190,000
45,000
22,000
132 ?000 
27,500
20,000
37,000
50,000
5,000
8,000
7,700
22,500
22,000
ALTITUDE
1,000
1,500
1,400
800
300
19,323
19.323
850 
800-10,000
ESCAPE 
ESCAPE 
ESCAPE
19,323
750
INCLINATION
28.5
28.5
98.0
28.5
28.5
0.0 
0.0
28.5
45.0
0.0
97,0
Table 1. Potential NASA Programs in the 1990s
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Figure 12. SDCV Development Options
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